1.
Problem or
Deficiency in Existing Law
Current law provides:
Penal
Code Section 656 -Offenses also punishable by foreign law; double
jeopardy
FOREIGN CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL.
Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a
criminal prosecution under the laws of another State, Government, or
country, founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is on
trial, he has been acquitted or convicted, it is a sufficient defense.
Penal Code Section 793. Jeopardy
in another state or country
CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL IN ANOTHER
STATE A BAR WHERE THE JURISDICTION IS CONCURRENT. When an act charged
as a public offense is within the jurisdiction of another State or
country, as well as of this State, a conviction or acquittal thereof in
the former is a bar to the prosecution or indictment therefor in this
State.
Read together,
these sections provide a complete defense and prohibit subsequent
prosecution for any offense based on the same acts when a defendant has
been previously convicted or acquitted of an offense in any
jurisdiction: local, state, federal or foreign. These statutes bar
local prosecution in cases where the most basic victims’ rights are
ignored, sham prosecutions are conducted, and public safety
compromised.
In addition to the
statutory provisions, such rights are further guaranteed by the double
jeopardy clause of both the California and the United States
Constitution[1]
(which will remain unaffected by this legislation). The constitutional
and statutory provisions differ in two areas:
1) Constitutional
provisions and subsequent case law do not prohibit subsequent
prosecution for the same offense.
[2]
California is one of eleven states who apply a “same act or omission”
standard;[3]
and,
2) Constitutional
provisions and subsequent case law do not expressly prohibit
prosecution after a foreign conviction or acquittal. California is one
of six states who afford such protection.[4]
Although the
integrity of a conviction or acquittal is adequately safeguarded by the
United States Constitution and the Constitutions of each of the fifty
states, such protections do not exist in many foreign jurisdictions.
Foreign jurisdictions are free to disregard such fundamental rights as
the defendant’s right to a speedy trial, right to a public trial, right
to a jury trial, and right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
Additionally,
foreign prosecution is often conducted in complete derogation of the
Victim’s Bill of Rights;[5]
the victim’s right to attend all proceedings;[6]
the victim’s right to be present at sentencing and to address the court;[7]
the victim’s right to be notified when the defendant escapes or is
released;[8]
and a myriad of rights which victims and their advocacy groups have
fought hard to attain.
[9]
Although the victim
or their next of kin may be “allowed” to travel to another state or
foreign jurisdiction to witness or testify at trial, in reality, most
cannot. There is no “guarantee[s] of sufficient punishment”.
“[P]ublic safety is [not] protected and encouraged as a goal of highest
importance”. In a foreign jurisdiction, there is no guarantee that
“relevant evidence shall not be excluded” and no guarantee that
prior convictions will be used to impeach or enhance sentence.
When a foreign
country or other jurisdiction fails or refuses to prosecute or sentence
in a manner consistent with California law or the Anglo-American system
of jurisprudence, these statutes sanction sham prosecutions, allow
suspects to escape justice, continue to jeopardize the public safety,
and ignore the rights of victims. One can only imagine the consequences
if one of the 911 terrorist suspects were apprehended and prosecuted in
an anti-American jurisdiction.
In California,
this problem is most acute as it relates to fugitives who flee to
Mexico, because:
1) The proximity
of Mexico to California and our open borders make escape possible within
minutes to hours after the commission of the crime. In Los Angeles
County alone, it is estimated that more than sixty fugitives facing
murder charges have fled to Mexico.
2) Although by
treaty, Mexico may refuse to extradite a “national”, and may refuse to
extradite without a death penalty waiver, the Mexican Supreme Court has
recently ruled that any life sentence, with or without the possibility
of parole, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
their Constitution.[10]
Mexican courts have also begun to require “judicial assurances” and in
some cases have refused to expel, deport or extradite U.S. citizens. In
California there are approximately 40 “life-top” crimes for which
extradition is no longer available because of this decision.[11]
3) When
extradition is denied based on “nationality”, a term very loosely
defined by the Mexican
government, the matter is converted to an Article IV prosecution by
operation of Mexican law.[12]
In the enactment of these laws which arguably violate the Extradition
Treaty, Mexico has set up a situation where they have usurped
California’s sovereign right to prosecute and punish for crimes
committed on our soil according to our laws and in complete derogation
of victims’ rights.
2.
Describe your proposal in detail.
Amend Sections
656 and 793 of the Penal Code as follows:
Penal Code Section 656 -Offenses also
punishable by foreign law; [D]double jeopardy
FOREIGN CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL.
Whenever on the trial of an accused person it appears that upon a
criminal prosecution under the laws of another State or the
Government of the
United States, or country,
founded upon the act or omission in respect to which he is on trial, he
has been acquitted or convicted, it is a sufficient defense.
Penal Code Section 793. Jeopardy in
another state or country
United States Federal Court
CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL IN ANOTHER STATE
A BAR WHERE THE JURISDICTION IS CONCURRENT. When an act charged as a
public offense is within the jurisdiction of another State or country
United States Federal Court, as well as of this State, a conviction or
acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to the prosecution or
indictment therefor in this State.
3 Estimate the number of cases
in our office which would be affected by your proposal.
It
is difficult to predict the number of cases that would be impacted by
this proposal. Prosecutions would be commenced only upon the voluntary
return of a fugitive to the United States after a foreign conviction or
acquittal. In most cases, depending on extradition treaties, the
fugitive’s return would be sought through formal or informal extradition
procedures before jeopardy has attached.
4.
Facts/Case Law/Statistics/Reports/Studies in support of your
proposal.
Anecdotal
information gathered includes the following case studies:
A) On
April 7, 1988, 19 counts of child molestation in violation of Penal Code
section 288 were filed against Nicholas Aguilar Rivera, a Catholic
priest. These charges involved twelve separate child victims. On the
day that the crimes were reported to the parish priest, Father Aguilar
fled to Mexico. In 1988, the case was submitted directly to Mexico for
an Article IV prosecution[13].
In 1989 and again in 1993, representatives of the Mexican government
requested copies of birth certificates of the victims. Although the
birth certificates had been previously provided at the time of the
filing of the case in Mexico, and were not a necessary jurisdictional
element, such birth certificates were immediately provided. In 1993,
representatives from the Los Angeles Police Department personally hand
carried the documents to Mexico City. The case continued to be delayed
for unknown reasons and was ultimately called for trial in Mexico City
in 1995. At that time, the Mexican judge ruled that the statute of
limitations had run, entered an acquittal, and dismissed the case. A
representative of the Procuradoria General de Mexico (PGR) advised the
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office, that “we were never going
to prosecute a priest”. Because of this acquittal, Father Rivera can no
longer be prosecuted in California for these crimes under Penal Code
section 656 and 793. If the defendant were to return to the United
States and commit any new felony, if would be charged as a first
offense, not a third strike case.
B. On
November 8, 1989, defendant Mario Abendano Chaidez shot 17 year old
Francisco Barajas Lopez. Chaidez lured victim Lopez out of his house to
confront him about Lopez’ telephone calls to defendant’s daughter.
After a brief conversation, victim Lopez walked away from defendant.
Defendant opened fire, shooting Lopez in the back of the head.
Defendant Chaidez
was charged with one court of murder in violation of Penal Code section
187(a) with a Penal Code section 12022.5 allegation. The maximum
penalty for the crime as charged in California would have been 35 years
to life.
On January 26,
1990, an Article IV case was presented for prosecution. Defendant
Chaidez was taken into custody in Mexico on March 14, 1991, ultimately
convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to eight years in prison. The
Unitary Court of the 15th Federal Circuit (Appellate Court)
affirmed the conviction but granted a “preliberation status” and ordered
defendant to serve his time on weekends after having served just two
years in custody.
On an unknown
date, defendant re-entered California. In October, 2002, he was
apprehended on the outstanding warrant. Pursuant to Penal Code sections
656 and 793, the warrant had to be recalled and quashed and the case
dismissed. If the defendant is subsequently arrested and convicted of
any felony, it would be charged as a first offense, not a second strike
case and there would be no five year enhancement for having suffered a
prior serious felony conviction.
C.
On September 10, 1994 defendant Miriam Rivera-Mendoza beat her three
year old son, Arturo, to death. The cause of death was head trauma and
at the time of his murder, victim Arturo was found to be malnourished
and badly bruised with two healing fractures, and a scar on his head.
On various occasions witnesses observed the victim to be hit, slapped,
burned, locked in a closet, made to stand in a trash car, have his head
held under water and his penis burned. The Department of Child Services
was called on four separate occasions. Defendant Miriam Rivera-Mendoza
was determined to the primary aggressor on most occasions, including the
fatal assault. Defendant Arturo Isaias Perez-Rodriguez also was known
to assault and injure the victim. On the evening of the murder,
defendants abandoned their three surviving children and fled to Mexico.
One count of
murder in violation of Penal Code section 187(a) and one count of Child
Abuse in violation of Penal Code section 273a(a)(1) was charged. The
maximum penalty as charged would have been 29 to life for each
defendant.
On January 25,
1997 each of the defendants was found “criminally responsible for the
crime of murder” and sentenced to 20 years in state prison. The Unitary
Court of the Sixth Circuit reduced the sentence to 10 years in state
prison.
D. On
February 8, 1995, defendants Duenas, Garcia, and Davalos were observed
drinking alcohol outside the Maravilla Housing Projects. A witness
observed one of the men break into a vehicle and steal a tool box. The
owner of the tool box and three others heard the noise, went outside and
recovered the tool box. Five minutes later, defendants broke down the
door to the residence where the victim was staying. Several residents,
including two small children, attempted to flee the location but were
prevented from leaving by defendants Garcia and Davalos. Defendant
Duenas followed the victim into a bedroom, demanded money and shot the
victim three times - twice in the back of the head and once in the
shoulder. All three defendants were identified as active gang members.
Defendants Garcia and Davalos were apprehended and prosecuted in Los
Angeles. Each was convicted of one count of murder in violation of
Penal Code section 187(a), attempted second degree robbery in violation
of Penal Code section 664/211, first degree residential burglary in
violation of Penal Code section 459, and second degree burglary of a
vehicle in violation of Penal Code section 459. Several allegations
were found true including the a special circumstance allegation that the
murder was committed while the defendants were engaged in the commission
of the crimes of robbery and burglary. Defendants Garcia and Davalos
were sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole
plus one year.
Defendant Duenas,
the actual shooter, fled to Mexico. In January, 1997, the case was
submitted to Mexico for prosecution under Article IV of the Mexican
Federal Penal Code. On May 19, 1999, defendant Duenas was convicted of
murder and sentenced to 20 years in prison by the Federal District Court
in Uruapan Michocan. On October 19, 2000, the Federal District Court in
Morella Michoacan reduced the sentence to 8 years in prison.
This case
graphically illustrates the disparate treatment of defendants. Under
California law, the accomplices to the murder were sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Under Mexican law, the
actual shooter who would have been subject to the death penalty or life
without the possibility of parole, was sentenced to eight years in
prison.
E.
Despite formal requests to the General Director of international Legal
Affairs, Mexican Attorney Generals office on June 19, 2002 and July 22,
2002, Mexico has failed and refused to provide information regarding the
results of 97 specific Article IV cases. Of those 97 cases, I have
been able to develop information through law enforcement sources
regarding 22 of those cases. That leaves 76 cases completely
unaccounted for. The vast majority of those cases involve murders.
2.
Are there alternatives
to your proposal, either legislative or non-legislative, which might
accomplish the same object? If so, why is your proposal a better
alternative?
There are no
alternatives that we are aware of that would effectively protect the
rights of the defendants, the rights of victims, and insure the safety
of the community consistent with the ends of justice.
3.
Are you aware of any
constitutional issues raised by your proposal? If so, briefly discuss.
No constitutional
issues are raised by the proposed legislation. As discussed above, this
legislation would have no affect on existing double jeopardy provisions
of the United States or California constitution.
4.
How much will your proposal cost? Will your proposal result in
any cost savings to our office, to other entities, or to the state?
No
additional costs or cost savings would result from subsequent
prosecution pursuant to this proposal other than those normally
associated with the prosecution of any criminal matter. The anticipated
additional caseload would be negligible and easily absorbed by existing
courts.
5.
Support: Please list individuals and organizations likely to
support your proposal.
Likely
supporters would be the California District Attorneys Association,
national, local and state victim advocacy groups such as “Justice for
Homicide Victims”, “Crime Victims United”, “Families and Friends of
Murdered Victims”, “Doris Tate Crime Victims Bureau/Foundation”,
“National Center for Missing and Exploited Children”, Memory of Victims
Everywhere”; all law enforcement agencies, associations, and
organizations, League of California Cities, National League of Cities,
Contract Cities Association.
9.
Opposition: Please list individuals and organizations likely
to oppose your proposal.
It
is unknown the extent to which the defense bar and organizations such as
the ACLU would oppose such legislation. Currently, defendants do not
currently enjoy even the most basis rights and liberties guaranteed by
the State of California and the United States of America when
prosecuted in many foreign jurisdictions.
It is unlikely
that Mexican Advocacy Groups would oppose such legislation since in the
vast majority of cases, the crimes committed by citizens who flee to
Mexico, are committed against victims of Hispanic descent.
6.
Urgency: Is there a need for speed? How fast must this matter
move?
There
is no urgency for the passage of these amendments. However, failure to
present this matter to the Legislature in a timely manner will result in
additional victimization and will indirectly encourage suspects who
commit crimes to flee the jurisdiction.
7.
Prior legislation: Has
there been any prior legislation in this area? If so, please provide
bill author, the year the legislation was introduced, and whether the
legislation was enacted?
Penal Code
sections 656 and 793 were both enacted in 1872 and have remained
unchanged for 130 years. Although the statutes have remained static,
with no attempts in the past to amend them from the time of enactment to
the present, the scope and number of bilateral treaties have drastically
increased. Penal Code sections 656 and 793 were enacted in a time that
is currently and historically irrelevant to the present multi-national
environment. The two existing constitutional provisions are
sufficiently flexible because they are broadly drafted, while the
statutes in their current form are over-limiting and have resulted in
the abuses and inequities discussed above. In addition to those
defendants who escape justice completely by inadequate or sham
proceedings, prosecution in multiple defendant cases where one of the
suspects flees the country and another remains have resulted in
disparate treatment. To enact one set of standards for those who flee
the jurisdiction to a foreign country and another set of standards for
those who remain runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the
United States and California constitutions.[14]
11. Will you be
available for consultation and, if necessary, to travel to Sacramento to
testify regarding this legislation between February 1, and September 1
of next year?
Yes
[1]
U.S. Consti., 5th
Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, Sections 15, 24.
See also In re Saul S. (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 1061, 1064
which states in pertinent part: “Both the United States and
California Constitutions provide that a person may not be twice
placed in jeopardy for the same offense . . . The double
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment applied to the states
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .
The protection against double jeopardy in the California
Constitution is the same as that in the federal Constitution”.
[2]
T he United States Supreme Court has determined that
subsequent prosecutions based on the same underlying conduct do
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause if the prosecutions are
brought by separate sovereigns and meet the “same elements
test. (Blockbuster vs. U.S. (1932) 284 U.S. 299;U.S.
v. Dixon (1993) 113 S.Ct. 2849).
[3]
See also: A.C.A. Section 5-1-114 (2002) (Arkansas); C.R.S.
18-1-303 (2002)(Colorado); Idaho Code, Section 19-315 (2002);
MCLS Section 333.7409 (2002) (Michigan); Montana Code Annotated,
Section 46-11-504 (2002); NRS Section 171.070 (2002) (Nevada);
N.J. Stat. Section 2C:1-11 (2002) (New Jersey); N.D. Cent. Code,
Section 29-03-13 (2002) (North Dakota); 22 Okl. St. Section 130
(2002) (Oklahoma); W.Va. Code, Section 60S-4-405 (2002)
[4]
See also: Idaho Code section 19-315; Miss. Code Ann., Section
99-11-27 (2001)(Mississippi); NRS, Section 171.070
(2002)(Nevada); N.D. Cent. Code, Section 29-03-13 (2002)(North
Dakota); 22 Okl. St. Section 11130 (2002)(Oklahoma).
[5]
Cal. Constitution, Article I, Section 28
[6]
Penal Code section 1102.6(A)
[7]
Penal Code Section 1191.1
[8]
Penal Code Section 679.03
[9]
Such rights include, but are not limited to: Aids Testing
(Penal Code section 1524.1); civil recovery rights (Penal Code
section1191.2); Compensation and salaries (Penal Code section
13835); Death penalty, family members, witnesses (Penal Code
section 679.03, 3605); Protection against disclosure of
information (Penal Code section 841, 1054.2); Relocation
expenses (Penal Code section 1202.4); In custody informant
notice (Penal Code section1191.25); Access to probation reports
(Penal Code section 1203d); Notice of release (Penal Code
sections 679.02, 679.03, 3058.8 , 4024.4); Protective Orders,
(Penal Code section 136.2)
[10]
Judicial Decision No 125/2001 (2001)
[11]
Penal Code sections 37(a); 128; 136.1, 186.22(b)(4);
182(a),;182.5, 182(a); 187(a), 189, 190(a) (murder 1st
with or without special circumstances); 187(a); 189, 190.03;
187(a),189, 190.25, 187(a), 189, 190.5(b), 187(a), 190(a), (b),
(c), or (d); 187,190.05; 187(a), 190.26, 191.5(d); 205; 206,
206.1; 209(a); 209(b); 209.5(a); 211, 213(a)(1)(A), or 215 with
186.22(b)(4); 217.1(b); 218; 219; 246,186.22(b)(4); 269; 273ab;
451.5; 519, 186.22(b)(4); 664(a), 187, 189; 667(e)(2)(A);
667.51(d); 667.61(a); 667.61(b); 667.7(a)(1); 667.7(a)(2);
667.71(a)(b); 667.75; 1170.12(c)(2)(A); 4500; 11418(b)(1);
12022.53(d); 12022.55, 186.22(b)(4); 12308; 12310(a); 12310(b);
Military and Veterans Code 1670, 1672(a); 1671, 1672(b)
[12]
Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States, Article 9, 2. (hereinafter “the
Extradition Treaty”, see 31 U.S.T. 5061) “If extradition is not
granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested
Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution . . .” See also Agenda Penal Federal
(Mexican Federal Penal Code, Book I, Preliminary Title, Article
IV. “Crimes committed in foreign territory by a Mexican against
a Mexican or against a foreigner, or by a foreigner against a
Mexican, will be punished in the Republic of Mexico, in
accordance with federal law, if the following requirements are
met: 1. That the accused by in the Republic of Mexico; II.
That the prisoner has not been definitively tried in the country
where is committed the crime; and III. That the infraction with
which he is charged be a crime both in the country where it was
committed and in the Republic of Mexico”. (Unofficial
translation by Texas Attorney General)
[14]
U. S. Constit., 14th Amend., states in pertinent
part: “. . . No state shall make or enforce any law which . . .
shall . . . deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”; Cal. Const., art. I, section 24 states
in pertinent part: “In criminal cases, te rights of a defendant
to equal protection of the laws. . . shall be construed by the
courts of this state in a manner consistent with the
Constitution of the United States . . .This Constitution shall
not be construed by the courts to afford greater rights to
criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of
the United States. . .”